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In the recent philosophy of explanation, a growing attention to and discussion of 
non-causal explanations has emerged, as there seem to be compelling examples of 
non-causal explanations in the sciences, in pure mathematics, and in metaphysics. 
I defend the claim that the counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE) captures 
the explanatory character of both non-causal scientific and metaphysical 
explanations. According to the CTE, scientific and metaphysical explanations are 
explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies between the 
explanandum and the explanans. I support this claim by illustrating that CTE is 
applicable to Euler’s explanation (an example of a non-causal scientific 
explanation) and Loewer’s explanation (an example of a non-causal metaphysical 
explanation). 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, one finds a strikingly common theme in philosophy of 
science, philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics: an increasing attention to 
non-causal explanations. 1  Many philosophers of science, philosophers of 
mathematics and metaphysicians take seriously the view that (a) there are – 
alongside with familiar causal explanations – compelling examples of non-causal 
explanations in the sciences, and that (b) there are instances of non-causal 
explanations in pure mathematics and in metaphysics. According to this view, 
explanation is a goal of many epistemic endeavors, not merely of the natural and 
social sciences.  
A significant amount of work has been dedicated to understanding the 
differences and commonalities of explanations in the sciences and in pure 
mathematics (see Steiner 1978; Kitcher 1984; and, more recently, Mancosu 2011; 
Lange 2013, 2014). However, the debates on scientific explanation and 
metaphysical explanation are, by and large, not well connected (Ruben 2012; 
Schaffer 2015, and Wilson [manuscript] are notable recent exceptions). In this 
paper, I will only attempt to make a connection between two of these largely 
separate debates in arguing that at least some non-causal explanations in the 
sciences and in metaphysics can be captured by the same theory of explanation – 
the counterfactual theory of explanation. Due to the complexity of the subject 
matter, I will not address non-causal explanations in pure mathematics in this 
paper. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This attention to non-causal explanations sometimes takes a critical tone – see, 
for instance, Bueno and French (2012), Skow (2014), and Strevens (forthcoming). 
However, it is not the goal of this paper to discuss the critics of (certain kinds of) 
non-causal explanations. 
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 What motivates the increasing attention to non-causal explanations? In the 
recent literature, the view that one finds non-causal explanations in the sciences, 
pure mathematics, and metaphysics is supported by the following examples: 
 
• Non-causal (and causal) explanations in the sciences. Without doubt, there 
are well-known examples of causal explanations in the natural and social 
sciences, including detailed mechanistic explanations (Bechtel and Richardson 
1993; Machamer et al. 2000) and ‘higher-level’, ‘coarse-grained’, or ‘macro’ 
causal explanations (Cartwright 1989; Woodward 2003). However, the causal 
explanations do not exhaust the class of all scientific explanations, or so 
several philosophers have argued. In addition to causal explanations, one 
encounters compelling examples of non-causal explanations. Such examples 
include different kinds of so-called ‘mathematical’ explanations of contingent 
empirical phenomena (not to be confused with explanations in pure 
mathematics!) such as graph-theoretic (Pincock 2012; Lange 2013a; see 
already van Fraassen 1989), topological (Huneman 2010; Lange 2013a), 
geometric (Lange 2013a), and genuinely statistical explanations (Lipton 2004; 
Lange 2013b). For the sake of convenience, I will call these explanations 
‘applied mathematical’ explanations. Other kinds of non-causal explanations 
in physics include explanations based on symmetry principles and 
conservation laws (Lange 2011), kinematics (Saatsi forthcoming), 
renormalization group theory (Batterman 2000, Reutlinger forthcoming), 
dimensional analysis (Lange 2009a, Pexton 2014), and inter-theoretic 
relations (Batterman 2002; Weatherall 2011).2  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Explanations based on network models are promising, though controversial, 
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• Non-causal explanations in pure mathematics. Philosophers of mathematics 
and mathematicians distinguish between explanatory and non-explanatory 
proofs, where the former are taken to be explanatory in a non-causal way (see, 
for instance, in the recent literature, Mancosu 2008, 2011; and Lange 2014; 
see Steiner 1978; Kitcher 1984, 1989 for pioneering work). The explananda of 
explanatory proofs in pure mathematics are theorems, while applied 
mathematical explanations explain the occurrence of contingent phenomena.   
• Non-causal explanations in metaphysics. A growing number of 
metaphysicians adopt the view that if one kind of facts grounds another kind 
of facts, then the former facts metaphysically explain why the latter kind of 
facts exists.3 For instance, a physicalist holds that if physical facts ground 
mental facts, then the physical facts metaphysically explain the existence of 
the mental facts. In the current debates in metaphysics, grounding is taken to 
be a non-causal dependence relation whose explanatory power is, thus, non-
causal (to take only a few voices from the enormous literature on grounding, 
see Fine 2001, 2012; Schaffer 2009, 2015; Schnieder 2011; Correira and 
Schnieder 2012a; Loewer 2012; Ruben 2012; Wilson manuscript).  
  
The view that there are non-causal explanations in the sciences, in pure 
mathematics, and in metaphysics raises an interesting challenge, because this 
view is, prima facie, in tension with the currently dominating causal accounts of 
explanation in philosophy of science and elsewhere. According to causal 
accounts, there is a tight conceptual connection between explaining and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
candidates for non-causal explanations in the life and social sciences (Strogatz 
1994; Barabasi et al. 2006; Huneman 2010). 
3 Note that grounding need not be restricted to facts. It can be extended to other 
kinds of entities (see Fine 2001, 2012; Schaffer 2009).  
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identifying or representing causes (see, among many others, Salmon 1984; 
Cartwright 1989; Machamer et al. 2000; Woodward 2003; Strevens 2008). The 
common core of seminal causal accounts of explanation can be expressed as 
follows: to explain some phenomenon P just is to identify the (type or token level) 
causes of P. Examples of non-causal explanations are a direct challenge to causal 
accounts, because causal accounts of explanation – prima facie – cannot 
accommodate non-causal explanations and, hence, causal accounts do not provide 
a general account of all scientific explanations (as van Fraassen [1980: 123]; 
Achinstein [1983: 230-243]; Lipton [2004: 32] already noted). This dialectic 
situation leaves us with the task to come up with an appropriate theoretical 
response to the apparent fact that there are not only causal but also non-causal 
explanations. (However, note that Lewis 1986 and Skow 2014 advocate a 
significantly weakened, alternative causal account of explanation, see footnote 4 
below.) 
 In this paper, I will defend one specific monist approach to explanation, a 
counterfactual theory of explanation. I take monism to be the view that there is 
one single philosophical account capturing both causal and non-causal 
explanations. A monist holds that causal and non-causal explanations share a 
feature that makes them explanatory. Hempel’s covering-law account is an 
instructive historical example for illustrating monism. Hempel argued that causal 
and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of having one single feature 
in common: nomic expectability (Hempel 1965: 352). In the case of causal 
explanations, one expects the explanandum to occur on the basis on causal 
covering laws (laws of succession) and initial conditions; in the non-causal case, 
one’s expectations are based on non-causal covering laws (laws of coexistence) 
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and initial conditions. Moreover, in order to be applicable to mathematical and 
metaphysical explanations, a friendly amendment of the covering law account 
may even allow for (a) metaphysical covering laws (such as general statements 
about one kind of facts grounding another kind of facts), and (b) mathematical 
covering laws (that is, mathematical axioms). However, due to well-known 
problems of the covering-law account (Salmon 1989: 46-50), Hempel’s monism is 
at least not a viable option for dealing with all explanations in the scientific 
domain. 
 My goal in this paper is to explore a monist account that does not collapse 
into Hempel’s troubled version of monism. I claim that a counterfactual theory of 
explanation is a promising candidate for playing this role (building on and 
elaborating recent work by Frisch 1998; Bokulich 2008; Saatsi and Pexton 2013; 
Reutlinger forthcoming).4 However, I do not want to argue for a full-fledged 
monism, i.e. the claim that the counterfactual theory captures all kinds of (causal 
and) non-causal explanations in science and metaphysics (including the ones 
listed above). My goal in this paper is more modest: I will argue that the 
counterfactual theory can be successfully applied to two paradigmatic examples 
of non-causal explanations from science and metaphysics, which I take to be 
representative of a larger class of non-causal explanations: Euler’s explanation (a 
toy example of a non-causal scientific explanation) and Loewer’s explanation (an 
example of a non-causal metaphysical explanation).5 As indicated above, I will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Lange (2009b) for a related account. 
5	  One alternative option to monism is causal reductionism, i.e. the view that 
seemingly non-causal explanations can ultimately be understood as causal 
explanations. Lewis (1986) and Skow (2014) have presented the most compelling 
attempt to spell out this strategy. Lewis and Skow rely on the notion of providing 
information about the causal history of the explanandum. Their notion of ‘causal 
information’ is significantly broader, and weaker, than the notion of ‘identifying 
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not address the issue of whether the CTE is applicable to explanations in pure 
mathematics in this paper.   
 The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2, I introduce the 
counterfactual theory of explanation. In section 3, I argue that the counterfactual 
theory can be successfully applied to Euler’s explanation – the main purpose of 
this section (and of using Euler’s explanation) is to illustrate how the CTE works 
for the (toy) case of a non-causal explanation in the sciences. In section 4, I will 
explore whether the CTE also applies to Loewer’s explanation. In section 5, I 
qualify the CTE in three respects. 
 
 
2. The Counterfactual Theory of Explanation 
Is there a monist alternative to Hempel’s troubled monism? It is fruitful to take a 
suggestion of Peter Lipton’s as a stepping-stone for developing such a monist 
account. Having presented several examples of non-causal explanations, Lipton 
outlines a monist strategy for capturing both non-causal and causal explanations 
(in science): “One reaction to this would be to attempt to expand the notion of 
causation to some broader notion of ‘determination’ that would encompass the 
non-causal cases […].” (Lipton 2004: 32)6 However, Lipton is skeptical as to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the causes of the explanandum’ figuring in the causal accounts I have referred to 
earlier. For instance, Lewis and Skow hold that one explains causally by merely 
excluding a possible causal history of some explanandum E, or by stating that E 
has no cause at all – while other causal accounts would not classify this sort of 
information as causally explanatory. I cannot enter an in-depth discussion of the 
merits of causal reductionism here. I take it as premise – against causal 
reductionism – that there actually are non-causal explanations including the 
examples listed above and the two examples I will discuss in Sections 3 and 4.	  
6 See Kim (1974) and Ruben (2012) for related suggestions. 
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whether one can prevent such a “broader notion of determination” from collapsing 
into Hempelian monism: 
 
This approach has merit, but it will be difficult to come up with 
such a notion that we understand even as well as causation, without 
falling into the relation of deductive determination, which will 
expose the model to many of the objections to the deductive-
nomological model. (Lipton 2004: 32) 
 
I think Lipton was too hasty in dismissing the merit of explicating “some broader 
notion of ‘determination’ that would encompass the non-causal cases” (ibid.), 
because such a philosophical project need not necessarily rely on the covering-law 
account and a “relation of deductive determination” (ibid.). Following Lipton’s 
original suggestion, my claim is that Lipton’s envisioned broader notion of 
determination is the notion of the counterfactual dependence (of the explanandum 
on the explanans), as captured by counterfactual theories of explanation (for short, 
CTE). Perhaps the most influential version of the CTE7 is James Woodward’s (see 
Woodward 2003; and already Woodward 19798). Woodward summarizes the 
CTE as follows: 
 
An explanation ought to be such that it enables us to see what sort 
of difference it would have made for the explanandum if the factors 
cited in the explanans had been different in various possible ways. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I adopt Woodward’s (2003) terminology in calling it a counterfactual theory.  8	  It is interesting that Woodward (1979: 45-46) takes the CTE to be a charitable 
revision of the covering law account.  	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(Woodward 2003: 11) 
 
Explanation is a matter of exhibiting systematic patterns of 
counterfactuals dependence. (Woodward 2003: 191)  
 
The CTE is prima facie appealing from a monist perspective for two reasons: 
first, Woodward’s (2003: §5.3, §5.8) CTE avoids the notorious problems of the 
covering-law account (see below for a qualification of this claim). Second, 
although Woodward’s version of the CTE – and the underlying interventionist 
theory of causation – is mainly intended to fit causal explanations, the core idea of 
the CTE provides a natural way for specifying Lipton’s “broader notion of 
determination”. As Woodward suggests himself (but does not elaborate): 
 
[T]he common element in many forms of explanation, both causal 
and non-causal, is that they must answer what-if-things-had-been-
different questions. (Woodward 2003: 221). 
 
Answering “what-if-things-had-been-different questions” amounts to revealing 
(or exhibiting) – in Woodward’s words – what sort of difference it would have 
made for the explanandum if the factors cited in the explanans had been different 
in various possible ways. The monist proposal, according to the CTE, is that 
causal and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of exhibiting how 
the explanandum counterfactually depends on the explanans (Woodward 2003: 
13). Or, putting it in Lipton’s terms, the notion of counterfactual dependence is 
the broader notion of determination that one “expands” from causal explanations 
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such that it encompasses the non-causal explanations. This CTE-based monism 
has been explored, among others, by Frisch (1998), Bokulich (2008), Saatsi and 
Pexton (2013), Saatsi (forthcoming), and (AUTHOR) in the context of scientific 
explanations. My goal is to further elaborate and advance the CTE and to apply it 
to a novel example of non-causal explanations that proponents of the CTE have 
not yet addressed: namely, to a metaphysical explanation (Loewer’s explanation).  
 I will start with reconstructing the CTE in a way that emphasizes the 
“common element” (Woodward 2003: 221) of causal and non-causal explanations 
– this common element, I conjecture, is not essentially tied to an interventionist 
approach to causation (I will return to this issue below). In this reconstruction I 
largely follow Woodward’s (2003: 203) and Woodward and Hitchcock’s (2003: 6, 
18) exposition of the CTE. As a first step, the structure of an explanation has two 
parts: first, a statement E about the explanandum phenomenon; second, an 
explanans consisting of generalizations G1, …, Gm and auxiliary statements S1, 
…, Sn. Auxiliary statements often are statements about initial or boundary 
conditions specifying the state of the explanandum system (as Hitchcock and 
Woodward highlight those statements typically assert that variables take a certain 
value). But the auxiliary statements may also comprise other kinds of statements 
useful for explanations (for instance, Nagelian bridge laws, symmetry 
assumptions, limit theorems, and other modeling assumptions). According to the 
CTE, the relationship between the explanans and the explanandum is explanatory 
iff the following conditions are all satisfied: 
 
1. Veridicality condition: G1, …, Gm, S1, …, Sn, and E are (approximately) true 
or, at least, well confirmed. 
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2. Implication condition: G1, …, Gm and S1, …, Sn logically entail E or a 
conditional probability P(E|S1, …, Sn) – where the conditional probability 
need not be ‘high’ in contrast to Hempel’s covering-law account. 
3. Dependency condition: G1, …, Gm support at least one counterfactual of the 
form: had S1, …, Sn been different than they actually are (in at least one way 
deemed possible in the light of the generalizations), then E or the conditional 
probability of E would have been different as well.9  
 
The CTE provides a monist framework for causal and non-causal explanations – 
both kinds of explanation are explanatory because they rely on approximately true 
assumptions in the explanans, the explanans implies (a probability for the) 
explanandum, and, crucially, both kinds of explanation reveal counterfactual 
dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans.  
  
3. Illustrating the Counterfactual Theory: Euler’s explanation  
I will now argue for the claim that the CTE applies to one paradigmatic example 
of a non-causal scientific explanations, Euler’s explanation. I take Euler’s 
explanation to be a ‘toy’ example of a non-causal scientific explanation. The 
purpose of using Euler’s explanation is mainly to illustrate how the CTE applies 
to a non-causal explanation in the scientific domain (for an application of the CTE 
to ‘more serious’ non-causal scientific explanations, see Frisch 1998; Bokulich 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 I assume that a generalization supports counterfactuals only if the generalization 
is non-accidentally true or lawful. I use a broad notion of laws that includes non-
strict ceteris paribus laws, such as Woodward and Hitckcock’s own invariance 
account. However, my aim here is not to defend a particular view of laws. I want 
to suggest instead that the CTE is neutral with respect to alternative theories of 
non-accidental truth or lawhood. I take this to be a strength of the CTE.  
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2008; Kistler 2013; Saatsi and Pexton 2014; Pexton 2014; Pincock 2015; Saatsi 
forthcoming; Reutlinger forthcoming a,b). Then, in section 4, I will argue that the 
CTE also applies to a paradigmatic non-causal explanation from metaphysics: 
namely, Loewer’s metaphysical explanation of nomic facts. 
 Euler’s explanation is an intuitively simple and powerful non-causal 
“graph-theoretical” explanation (van Fraassen 1989: 236-239; Pincock 2012: 51-
53; Lange 2013a: 489; Reutlinger forthcoming). I use Euler’s explanation as a 
stand-in for graph-theoretical and network-based explanations (see Huneman 
2010).  
 In 1736, Königsberg had four parts of town and seven bridges connecting 
these parts. Interestingly, no one, at that time, ever succeeded in the attempt to 
cross all of the bridges exactly once. This surprising fact calls for an explanation. 
The mathematician Leonhard Euler provided an explanation. Euler’s explanation 
starts with representing relevant aspects of Königsberg’s geography with a graph. 
A simplified geographical map of Königsberg in 1736 represents only the four 
parts of town (the two islands A and B, and the two riverbanks C and D) and the 
seven bridges (part A is connected to 5 bridges, parts B, C and D are each 
connected to 3 bridges). This simplified geography of Königsberg can also be 
represented by a graph, in which the nodes represent the parts of town A-D and 
the edges represent the bridges.  
 Relying on this graph-theoretical representation, Euler defines an Euler 
path as a path through a graph G that includes each edge in G exactly once. Euler 
uses the notion of an Euler path to reformulate the explanandum in terms of the 
question: why has everyone failed to traverse Königsberg on an Euler path? His 
answer to this why-question has two components.  
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 First, Euler’s theorem according to which there is an Euler path through a 
graph G iff G is an Eulerian graph. Euler proved that a graph G is Eularian iff (i) 
all the nodes in G are connected to an even number of edges, or (ii) exactly two 
nodes in G (one of which we take as our starting point) are connected to an odd 
number of edges.10  
 Second, the actual bridges and parts of Königsberg are not isomorphic to 
an Eulerian graph, because conditions (i) and (ii) in the definition of an Eulerian 
graph are not satisfied: no part of town (corresponding to the nodes) is connected 
to an even number of bridges (corresponding to the edges), violating condition (i); 
and more than two parts of town (corresponding to the nodes) are connected to an 
odd number of bridges (corresponding to the edges), violating condition (ii). 
Königsberg could have been isomorphic to an Eulerian graph in 1736, but as a 
matter of contingent fact it was not. 
 Therefore, Euler concludes from the first and the second component that 
there is no Euler path through the actual Königsberg. This explains why nobody 
ever succeeded in crossing all of the bridges of Königsberg exactly once. 
 Does the CTE capture Euler’s explanation? Euler’s explanation has the 
structure demanded by the CTE: the explanans consists of Euler’s theorem (a 
mathematical and intuitively non-causal generalization) and the statement that all 
parts are actually connected to an odd number of bridges. The explanandum 
phenomenon is that everyone has failed to cross the city on an Euler path.  
Moreover, all three conditions that the CTE imposes on the explanans and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 One may, of course, also ask whether the proof for Euler’s theorem is an 
explanatory proof. However, this question changes the topic and, hence, the 
explanandum, because it concerns an explanation in pure mathematics (as 
opposed to an applied mathematical explanation). As mentioned in Section 1, I 
will not address this topic.  
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explanandum are satisfied: 
  
1. The veridicality condition holds because (a) Euler’s theorem, (b) the 
statement about the contingent fact that each part of Königsberg is actually 
connected to an odd number of bridges, and (c) the explanandum 
statement are all true.11   
2. The implication condition is met, since Euler’s theorem together with the 
statement about the contingent fact entail the explanandum statement.  
3. The dependency condition is satisfied, because Euler’s theorem supports 
the counterfactual “if all parts of Königsberg were connected to an even 
number of bridges, or if exactly two parts of town were connected to an 
odd number of bridges, then people would not have failed to cross all of 
the bridges exactly once”. 
 
Therefore, I conclude that the CTE applies to Euler’s explanation. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Although the veridicality condition is met in the case of Euler’s explanation, 
one might worry that it does not hold for all scientific explanation, because (a) 
many scientific explanations involve idealized assumption, and (b) how-possibly 
explanations play an important epistemic role in the sciences. Both idealized and 
how-possibly explanations do not meet the veridicality condition. Regarding 
idealized explanations, it is, however, often possible to (re)interpret the 
idealizations in a way that is compatible with the veridicality condition by 
adopting, for instance, a dispositionalist and minimalist accounts of idealizations 
(see Cartwright 1989; Hüttemann 2004; Strevens 2008). Regarding how-possibly 
explanations, I ultimately agree that the veridicality condition has to be rejected, if 
the CTE is supposed to be an account of both how-possibly and how-actually 
explanations. However, many prominent accounts of explanations (including 
Woodward’s version of the CTE) are (at least, implicitly) presented as accounts of 
how-actually explanations. In this vein, I also introduce the CTE as an account of 
how-actually explanations; this account can, of course, be weakened in the case of 
how-possibly explanations (see Reutlinger et al. for my approach to how-possibly 
explanations and toy models).    
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4. Applying the CTE to Metaphysics: Loewer’s Explanation 
I will now turn to an example of a non-causal explanation from the domain of 
metaphysics – which I call ‘Loewer’s explanation’ – and explore whether the 
CTE captures the example.  
 Barry Loewer has recently argued that Humean accounts of laws of nature 
provide a metaphysical explanation. According to this explanation, the Humean 
mosaic of a world metaphysically explains the nomic facts of that world: 
 
On Lewis’ account [of laws] the Humean mosaic metaphysically 
determines the L-laws. It metaphysically explains (or is part of the 
explanation together with the characterization of a Best Theory) why 
specific propositions are laws. (Loewer 2012: 131, emphasis added) 
 
To avoid misunderstandings, Loewer’s explanation is just meant to be one 
example of a non-causal explanation from metaphysics. My goal is not to defend 
Humeanism, but to argue for the claim that the CTE captures at least some 
metaphysical explanations and, thereby, explicates what makes them explanatory 
(see below for my remarks on the scope of the CTE in the realm of metaphysical 
explanations). 
Loewer argues that this metaphysical explanation is typical for a larger class 
of metaphysical explanations that rely on grounding relations (and perhaps other 
kinds of metaphysical dependence relations such as constitution, supervenience, 
realization, and so on): 
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The relevant kind of metaphysical explanation is one in which a type 
of fact – say mental facts – is shown to be grounded in or constituted 
by some other kind of fact – say neurological fact. (ibid.) 
 
In other words, Loewer seems to hold that if neurological facts ground mental 
facts, then neurological facts metaphysically explain mental facts; and if the 
Humean mosaic grounds the nomic facts, then the Humean mosaic metaphysically 
explains the nomic facts. Proponents of grounding tend to agree with Loewer that 
grounding relations are intimately connected to explanatory power (see, for 
instance, Rosen 2010; Fine 2012; Schaffer 2009, 2015; Wilson manuscript, Ruben 
2012; see Correira and Schnieder 2012b for an overview). To consider one 
prominent example, Fine claims that “philosophy is often interested in questions 
of explanation – of what accounts for what – and it is largely through the 
employment of the notion of ontological ground that such questions are to be 
pursued.” (Fine 2012: 40)  
However, what does it mean to say that grounding is explanatory? Which 
theory of explanation captures the explanatory power of grounding (or of 
grounding claims)? Loewer has little to say in response to this question. He draws 
attention to the fact that (causal and non-causal) scientific explanations and 
metaphysical explanations differ in important respects: 
 
Metaphysical explanation need not involve laws [of nature, A.R.] and 
the explanandum and explanans must be co-temporal (if the explanans 
is a temporal fact or property). (Loewer 2012: 131) 
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Scientific explanation of a particular event or fact need not show that 
it is grounded in a more fundamental event or fact but rather, 
typically, shows why the event occurred in terms of prior events and 
laws. (ibid.) 
 
One further difference between metaphysical and scientific 
explanation is that the latter but not the former may be probabilistic. 
(ibid.) 
 
For present purposes, I agree with Loewer that scientific explanations differ from 
metaphysical explanations with respect to these features.  
 My focus is on the question whether we can make sense of the explanatory 
character of metaphysical and scientific explanations by using the same theory of 
explanation – even if scientific and metaphysical explanation differ in some 
features, as Loewer claims. Loewer explicitly puts this question aside, since he 
pursues other goals in his paper: “I don’t have anything like a thorough account of 
metaphysical explanation (or for that matter of scientific explanation)” (Loewer 
2012: 131). In the remainder of this section, I will explore whether the CTE 
captures Loewer’s explanation as a specific non-scientific kind of non-causal 
explanation. My claim is that the CTE applies, if one is prepared to accept a 
salient epistemological difference between metaphysical and scientific 
explanations. 
 Loewer’s explanation satisfies the structure that the CTE requires. The 
explanans consists of two elements: first, a metaphysical and intuitively non-
causal grounding generalization ‘the entire Humean mosaic grounds the nomic 
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facts’. 12  According to the CTE, grounding generalizations figuring in 
metaphysical explanations play a similar role to laws of nature in scientific 
explanations: most importantly, both grounding generalizations and laws of nature 
license inferences about the explanandum (implication condition of the CTE) and 
support counterfactuals (dependency condition of the CTE) (see Wilson 
manuscript). Second, the explanans also includes the auxiliary statements 
including (i) a description of the entire Humean mosaic M of some world w (in 
terms of fundamental predicates)13, (ii) the assumption that the best system 
account (BSA) of laws is true (see Lewis 1973, 1994; for Loewer’s amendment of 
Lewis’ original account see Loewer 2001, 2008, 2012). The explanandum 
phenomenon is that certain facts or propositions (call them ‘n-facts’) are the 
nomic facts or propositions of a world w.14 
 Does Loewer’s explanation satisfy the three constraints of the CTE? Two 
of the three conditions are met: 
 
• Implication Condition: The elements of the explanans (consisting of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 It is a controversial issue whether the Humean grounding generalization (or a 
Humean supervenience claim) holds in all possible worlds, or only in a restricted 
class of worlds (see Hall 2012 for an overview). 
13 See Cohen and Callender (2009) for a version of the BSA that is not committed 
to fundamental (or natural) predicates.	  
14 While Loewer seems to accept the grounding generalization as a key part of the 
explanans, there might be an alternative version of the Humean metaphysical 
explanation of laws that does not rely on grounding. This version is inspired by 
the Canberra plan. According to the Canberra plan version, the explanans consists 
of the following assumptions: (1) Conceptual analysis: A general statement l is a 
law in world w iff l is a theorem or axiom of the best system of w. (2) Empirical 
fact: The mosaic of a world w is such that l is an axiom or theorem of the best 
system of w. Assumptions (1) and (2) entail the explanandum: (3) Statement l is a 
law in w. The crucial point here is that the CTE also captures the Canberra plan 
version of the Humean explanation of laws. Most importantly, the decisive 
counterfactual is true in Loewer’s version and in the Canberra plan version; see 
below.  
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description of the entire mosaic M of world w, the grounding generalization, 
and the BSA) entail that the n-facts are the nomic facts of w. 
• Dependency Condition: The grounding generalization (in conjunction with the 
BSA) supports a counterfactual of the form: there is at least one 
metaphysically possible way the mosaic could be, M*, such that if the mosaic 
of world w were M* (and not M, as it actually is), then the n-facts would not 
be the laws of w. – Being primitively asymmetric, the grounding relation 
determines the relevant direction of counterfactual dependence, and, hence, 
the direction of explanation runs from the Humean mosaic (the grounding 
fact) to the nomic facts (the grounded facts), and not vice versa. In section 5, I 
will return to the issue of the asymmetry of non-causal explanations.  
 
Applying the CTE is somewhat less straightforward with regard to the 
Veridicality Condition. Certainly, Humeans take all of the explanatory 
assumptions to be true, and these assumptions may as well be true. But we do not 
know whether the Humean explanans is true. For instance, we do not know what 
the entire mosaic of our world is like and we do not know whether the Humean 
grounding generalization is true. Moreover, we do not actually know how to infer 
the laws from the mosaic; rather we know how to draw this inference only in 
principle but not in practice (Loewer 2008: 160). Instead of empirical evidence, 
Humeans rely on indirect epistemological arguments (see, Earman and Roberts 
2005) and ontological arguments based on criteria such as parsimony and 
fruitfulness (a great example is the interchange between the Humean Loewer 
[Loewer 2012: sect. 5] and the anti-Humean Maudlin [Maudlin 2007: chap. 6]). 
However, this epistemic situation is by no means a unique feature of Humean 
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metaphysics. We also do not know whether the explanatory assumptions of, say, 
anti-Humeans are true. In fact, this seems to be the normal epistemic situation in 
metaphysics and an explicitly acknowledged methodological issue in 
metametaphysics (see, for instance, the contributions in Ross et al. 2013). 
  This is not necessarily a problem as such, because the CTE, in principle, 
allows for (scientific and metaphysical) explanations whose explanantia we 
currently do not (fully) know to be true and perhaps never will – i.e. how-possibly 
explanations.15 Accordingly, one tempting reaction is to interpret metaphysical 
explanations as how-possibly explanations (Nozick 1981: 8-11). It is quite 
plausible to interpret a Humean as answering the following how-possibly 
question: how is it possible that there are laws (and causes and probabilities) 
without positing ‘necessary connections’ in nature? Moreover, Loewer’s own 
work in metaphysics of science is a perfect guide to additional how-possibly 
questions that one might want to ask from a Humean perspective such as: how is 
it possible that there are causes if the world is fundamentally non-causal (Loewer 
2008)? And how is it possible that there are objective probabilities if the world’s 
fundamental dynamical laws are deterministic (Loewer 2001, 2012)? Being 
concerned with how-possibly questions is nothing to be ashamed of and not 
unique to metaphysics, because appealing to how-possibly explanations is also a 
respectable part of science (see Grüne-Yanoff 2007; Weisberg 2013; Reutlinger et 
al. forthcoming). 
 To sum up this discussion, the CTE applies to Loewer’s metaphysical 
explanation, if one is willing to relax the veridicality condition and, thereby, 
allows for how-possibly explanations.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See footnote 11 regarding two qualifications with respect to the veridicality 
condition in the context of scientific explanations. 
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 I want to conclude this section with two remarks about the scope of the 
CTE in the context of metaphysical explanations.  
First, the applicability of the CTE is likely to generalize to Humean 
metaphysical explanations of causes and objective probabilities – that is, if the 
Humean mosaic ground facts about causes and probabilities, then the mosaic 
metaphysically explains what the causes and probabilities in a world are. As 
highlighted above, I take Humeanism – and Loewer’s explanation – to be no more 
than an illustrative example for a non-causal and also non-scientific explanation. 
Prima facie, the CTE also applies to anti-Humean metaphysical explanations. For 
instance, a necessitarian (such as Armstrong 1983) and a primitivist about laws 
(such as Maudlin 2007) may assert that the laws (that is, a necessitation relation 
holding between universals, and, respectively, the fundamental laws of temporal 
evolution) metaphysically explain the existence of regularities in the world. If the 
CTE is right, then such anti-Humean metaphysical explanations of regularities 
rely on counterfactuals of the form ‘if the laws were different, then the regularities 
would be different’. In sum, I believe it is only mildly speculative to assert that 
CTE generalizes to all grounding explanations, if the explanatory grounding facts 
exist as a matter of metaphysical contingency. For Humeans, the grounding fact, 
the mosaic, exists contingently; for necessitarians and primitivists, the grounding 
facts, the laws, exist contingently (for a remark on dispositional essentialism, see 
footnote 16 below).  
 Second, the CTE also seems to have clear limitations: prima facie, it does 
not apply to those metaphysical explanations referring to grounding facts that 
exist necessarily. Consider a toy example: the mathematical fact that 1+1=2 (that 
we take to be a necessary fact) grounds the truth of the sentence ‘1+1=2’. Suppose 
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that, due to the grounding relation, the mathematical fact that 1+1=2 
metaphysically explains the truth of the sentence ‘1+1=2’. According to the CTE, 
this explanation must involve the counterfactual “if it were the case that 1+1≠2, 
then the sentence ‘1+1=2’ would be false”. The trouble with this counterfactual is 
that its antecedent expresses an impossible proposition.16 In order to deal with this 
difficulty, a proponent of the CTE faces, at least, three options: (i) to defend the 
ambitious claim that one can evaluate counterfactuals with (logically or 
metaphysically) impossible antecedents as non-vacuously true or false, and, 
moreover, that the truth value of those counterfactuals corresponds to our 
intuitions about the explanation at hand (see Schaffer 2015: sect. 3.1; also Wilson 
manuscript), (ii) to deny that the grounding claim in question is explanatory, and 
(iii) to accept that the CTE does not capture all metaphysical explanations (but 
only those referring to contingently existing grounding facts), and, hence, full 
fledged monism fails and the CTE ought to be supplemented by an additional 
theory of those metaphysical explanations drawing on necessarily true 
propositions. Discussing the merit of these options is a challenge for future 
research. I will not even attempt to address these difficult questions in the present 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 At first glance, the same problem appears to arise in the context of dispositional 
essentialism about laws. According to dispositional essentialism, the nomic 
essence of some property P grounds the regularities involving instantiation of P in 
a world (see, for instance, Bird 2007). A proponent of the CTE might be tempted 
to cash out the explanatory content of this grounding claim in terms of the 
counterfactual “if P had a non-actual nomic essence, then regularities would be 
different than they actually are”. According to dispositional essentialism, this 
antecedent is metaphysically impossible. However, a dispositional essentialist is 
certainly not committed to this prima facie problematic counterfactual within the 
CTE framework. A much more plausible and more useful counterfactual is this 
one: ‘if some non-actual ‘alien’ property P* with a different nomic essence than 
P’s nomic essence were instantiated (rather than P) in world w, then the 
regularities in w would be different than the actual regularities’. The antecedent of 
this conditional is not impossible and suffices to spell out the explanatory content 
of the grounding claim that the dispositional essentialist makes.   
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paper.17 
 
5. Qualifications  
Let me add three qualifications in order to sharpen the CTE and to avoid potential 
misunderstandings.  
 First, one can still distinguish between causal and non-causal explanations 
within the CTE framework as follows: non-causal explanations are explanatory by 
virtue of exhibiting non-causal counterfactual dependencies; causal explanations 
are explanatory by virtue of exhibiting causal counterfactual dependencies. 
Although I consider the distinction between causal/non-causal counterfactual 
dependencies as a primitive for present concerns, I have argued explicitly for a 
positive account of how one might draw the distinction (see AUTHOR a,b). 
Following Bertrand Russell (1912/13) and present-day Neo-Russellians, I propose 
that causal relations are characterized by necessary criteria such as asymmetry, 
time-asymmetry, distinctness of the relata, metaphysical contingency, and so on. 
Taking into account the Russellian criteria, my proposal is this: causal 
explanations reveal causal counterfactual dependencies if the dependency 
relations instantiate all of the Russellian criteria. Non-causal explanations exhibit 
non-causal counterfactual dependencies, if the dependency relations do not 
instantiating all of the Russellian criteria. However, the success of the CTE does 
not depend on my particular proposal for drawing the causal/non-causal line. 
 Second, the dependency condition can, to a certain extent, be disentangled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 I believe the very same problem arises in the context of explanations in pure 
mathematics, where the assumptions in the explanans seem to include necessary 
truth. It is an open research questions for me whether the CTE applies to 
explanations in pure mathematics or whether the CTE needs to be supplemented 
by an alternative theory of explanations in pure mathematics.   
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from (I) an interventionist account of causation (in the context of causal 
explanations), and from (II) a causal interpretation (in the context of non-causal 
explanations). Let me explain the claims (I) and (II) in detail.  
 I will turn to claim (I) first. In the context of causal explanations, 
Woodward interprets the dependency condition of the CTE in terms of 
interventionist counterfactuals whose antecedents state “if there were a possible 
intervention on the initial conditions (that is, the purported cause)”. However, a 
proponent of the CTE is not committed to an interventionist account of causation. 
Other broadly counterfactual accounts are also compatible with the CTE (that is, 
broadly counterfactual accounts including, for instance, von Wright 1971; 
Menzies and Price 1993; Lewis 2004; AUTHOR).18 In this paper, it is not my 
goal to argue for any particular counterfactual account of causation. As a 
consequence, I will not commit myself to the claim that – in the context of causal 
explanation – the counterfactuals mentioned in the dependency condition of the 
CTE have to be understood as interventionist counterfactuals (unlike, for instance, 
Schaffer [2015] and Wilson [manuscript] who defend an interventionist approach 
to grounding).  
Let me now address claim (II), i.e. the claim that the dependency condition 
can be disentangled from a causal interpretation. When discussing examples of 
non-causal explanations, Woodward himself voices another prima facie 
convincing reason for not requiring that all explanatory counterfactuals have the 
form of interventionist counterfactuals:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  One reason for choosing a non-interventionist counterfactual account of 
causation is that Woodward’s critics have recently argued that interventionist 
counterfactuals are inherently problematic and ultimately dispensable for 
understanding causation and causal explanation (see Strevens 2008). 
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 “When a theory or derivation answers a what-if-things-had-been different 
 question but we cannot interpret this as an answer to a question about what 
 would happen under an intervention, we may have a non-causal 
 explanation of some sort.” (Woodward 2003: 221)  
 
As I understand this quote, Woodward does not require that all explanatory 
counterfactuals have the form of interventionist counterfactuals: while causal 
explanations rely on interventionist counterfactuals, there are also non-causal 
explanations making use of non-interventionist counterfactuals. (Again, for 
proponents of a non-interventionist counterfactual theory of causation, I propose 
to draw a distinction between causal and non-causal counterfactuals in terms of 
the Russellian criteria; see above). 
 Based on the claims (I) and (II), I work with the minimal assumption that, 
in the dependency condition of the CTE, one should generally rely on 
counterfactuals of the form “if S1, …, Sn had been different than they actually are 
(in at least one way deemed possible in the light of the generalizations), then E or 
the conditional probability of E would have been different as well”. 19 
Furthermore, there is also a positive analogy to Woodward’s causal CTE 
regarding the existentially quantified form of the counterfactuals: the qualification 
‘in at least one way deemed possible in the light of the generalizations’ is 
analogous to the interventionist requirement that there be some possible 
intervention on the antecedent variable that leads to a change in the consequent 
variable; it is not required that all possible interventions have such an effect. 
 Third, I anticipate a potential worry at this point. One may wonder 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In Reutlinger (2013), I provide an in-depth discussion of non-interventionist 
counterfactuals and their semantics.  
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whether the non-causal version of the CTE avoids the problems of the covering-
law account. I can only sketch how the non-causal version of the CTE responds to 
these problems: 
 The problem of irrelevance: To avoid counterexamples such as the birth-
control pills scenario (Salmon 1989: 50), the non-causal CTE distinguishes 
between explanatorily relevant and irrelevant factors as follows: a factor is 
relevant only if the explanandum counterfactually depends on it (dependency 
condition), otherwise it is an irrelevant factor.  
The problem of low probabilities: To deal with the syphilis-paresis scenario 
(Salmon 1989: 49), the non-causal CTE allows for low probability explanations 
(implication condition).  
The flagpole-shadow scenario: consider the flagpole-shadow scenario 
(Salmon 1989: 47). The guiding intuition of the flagpole-shadow scenario is that 
the ‘correct’ explanation is a causal explanation (the height of the flagpole 
causally explains the length of the shadow) and that the covering law account 
does not have the means to identify it. One might worry that the CTE is also 
unable to identify the ‘correct’ causal explanation underlying the flagpole 
scenario. This worry is, however, unjustified, because the CTE is a theory of 
causal and non-causal explanations. Applying the CTE to causal explanations 
may take the form of supplementing the CTE with Woodward’s interventionist 
account of causation as the underlying theory of causation. As Woodward argues 
successfully (to my mind), a causal version of the CTE adequately describes the 
flagpole scenario (Woodward 2003: 155, 361). However, as I pointed out in the 
second qualification above, a proponent of the CTE is not committed to 
Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation. The CTE in combination with 
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other counterfactual accounts of causation (that do not rely on interventions) also 
correctly identifies the causal structure underlying the flagpole-shadow scenario 
(such counterfactual accounts of causation include, for instance, von Wright 1971; 
Lewis’ 2004; Menzies and Price 1993; AUTHOR). Thus, although the flagpole-
shadow scenario is a counterexample to the covering-law accounts, it is not a 
threat to the CTE.   
With respect to the flagpole-shadow scenario20, let me emphasize that one 
should disentangle two questions: (1) the question whether the flagpole-shadow 
scenario is a counterexample to the CTE, and (2) the question whether all non-
causal explanation display an asymmetry. The answers to these questions are 
logically independent of one another. Regarding (1), I hold that the flagpole-
shadow scenario is not a counter-example to the CTE (as I argued above). 
Regarding (2), I think there are good reasons to hold that some non-causal 
explanations are not asymmetric.21 While I agree that all causal explanations are 
asymmetric, I believe that some (for instance, Euler’s explanation), but not 
necessarily all, non-causal explanations lack such an asymmetry in that the 
counterfactual dependence in question is symmetric (for an elaborate argument 
for this claim see Frisch and Reutlinger manuscript; Kistler 2013).  
 However, the situation is importantly different and more straightforward 
for metaphysical grounding explanations. The grounding relation underlying a 
metaphysical explanation is usually taken to be (primitively) asymmetric (Fine 
2012; Schaffer 2015; Schnieder forthcoming; see Correira and Schnieder 2012b 
for an overview). Given that the grounding relation has an in-built asymmetry, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 I would like to thank a referee for urging me to address this point. 
21 This claim is not necessarily at odds with recent attempts to justify the claim 
that some non-causal explanations do in fact display an asymmetry (see Lange 
2011; Jansson forthcoming). 
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asymmetry of metaphysical explanations mirrors the underlying asymmetry of 
grounding (just as the directionality of some scientific explanations mirrors the 
causal asymmetry). Although I accept that the asymmetry is primitively built into 
the grounding relation, I do not claim that the explanatory character of grounding 
relations is a primitively built-in feature of this relation. Instead, the main claim of 
my paper is that the CTE provides an explication of the explanatory character of 
grounding explanations (see Section 4). 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the recent philosophy of explanation, a consensus has emerged, according to 
which there are non-causal explanations in the natural and social sciences, in pure 
mathematics, and in metaphysics – in addition to familiar causal explanations in 
the sciences. I have argued for the claim that the counterfactual theory of 
explanation (CTE) captures the explanatory character of scientific and 
metaphysical explanations. According to the CTE, causal and non-causal 
explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies 
between the explanandum and the explanans. I have argued that the CTE is 
applicable to two paradigms of non-causal explanations in the two areas of 
interest: Euler’s explanation (a toy example of a non-causal scientific explanation) 
and Loewer’s explanation (an example of a non-causal metaphysical explanation), 
if one allows for a relaxation of the veridicality condition. For this reason, I 
believe that the CTE is a promising monist approach to explanations in science 
and metaphysics alike. 
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